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Legal Censure of Unconventional Expressions of 






 In 2016, it is hard to believe that the law could still criminalize the 
private sexual activity of consenting adults.  Such prohibitions are 
immediately suspect within a system that values privacy and individual 
liberty, but even more so following the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Lawrence v. Texas, which recognized the criminalization of sodomy as 
unconstitutional.1  Despite such a significant legal development, 
practitioners of BDSM,2 a practice that often involves an element of pain 
incorporated into a sexual encounter, remain at risk of criminal prosecution 
for their private, consensual sexual activities. 
This note argues in support of legal recognition of consensual BDSM 
practices.  Currently, the laws against assault and battery do not provide an 
exception for consensual BDSM.  Consequently, a BDSM practitioner may 
be charged with criminally assaulting or battering a sexual partner despite 
having engaged in an activity that was completely consensual and not 
harmful in any meaningful way.  Consent is the legal difference between 
sex and rape, and so consent should also be the difference between BDSM 
and criminal assault or battery.  However, courts remain unwilling to even 
consider a defense of consent in assault and battery cases that include 
alleged BDSM activities.  This unwillingness seems to be based on stigma 
and bias surrounding the morality of BDSM practices, rather than 
legitimate state interests regarding harm prevention.  Recent case law, 
however, suggests that morality judgments are no longer an appropriate 
 
 * J.D., 2017, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  
 1. See discussion of Lawrence v. Texas infra Part II. 
 2. See introduction to BDSM infra Part I.A. 
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means of upholding legislation that criminalizes the private sexual conduct 
of consenting adults.  
Below, I will explore multiple ways in which the law has been used to 
enforce conventional morality and discourage untraditional or ‘taboo’ 
expressions of love and sexuality.  I will then explore how courts have 
recently been applying a stricter standard when it comes to laws affecting 
sexual privacy rights, and show that the same rationale should be used to 
extend legal recognition to BDSM practitioners. 
In Part I, I will use California as an example to introduce current laws 
defining assault and battery, which do not allow for consent to be used as a 
defense to criminal charges.  In that section, I will also explore how these 
laws technically make consensual BDSM practices illegal, even when those 
practices create no risk of permanent harm or serious injury.  Part II will 
examine a history of case law in the area of sexual privacy rights, with a 
focus on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas.  Part III will 
show how some courts have used the Lawrence decision to strike down 
laws that prohibit sexual expression in the form of sex toys, recognizing 
that the same arguments can be made in support of BDSM 
decriminalization.  Part IV will address how many courts have been 
unwilling to express moral judgments against polyamory, another 
unconventional expression of love and sexuality, recognizing again that the 
same arguments can be made in support of BDSM decriminalization.  
Finally, Part V will explore the various ways courts and legislators may 
officially recognize the difference between assault or battery and 
consensual BDSM. 
I. THE PRACTICAL CRIMINALIZATION OF BDSM 
PRACTICES 
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO BDSM 
 “BDSM” is an acronym that encompasses a number of sexual 
preferences and fetishes; bondage and discipline (BD), dominance and 
submission (DS), and sadism and masochism (SM).3  BDSM activities may 
involve a certain level of pain or physical force, such as slapping, 
scratching, or biting.4  Often times, practitioners use props, such as rope, 
whips, floggers, or paddles.5  These activities may result in minor injury, 
 
 3. MARGOT WEISS, TECHNIQUES OF PLEASURE; BDSM AND THE CIRCUITS OF SEXUALITY, 
at vii (2011). 
 4. Tess M. Gemberling et al., Psychological Functioning and Violence Victimization 
and Perpetration in BDSM Practitioners, NAT’L COAL. FOR SEXUAL PRIVACY 16 (2015), 
https://ncsfreedom.org/images/stories/2015_Survey_PDFs_ETC/NCSF%20Technical%20R
eport%20Mental%20Health%20Survey.pdf. 
 5. Id. at 15–16. 
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which could range from bruises and welts to scratches and scars, depending 
on the level of force agreed upon by the participants.6 
At the heart of BDSM culture is the importance placed on honesty, 
negotiation, and consent; all parties involved must desire and agree to the 
performed activities, as well as the results thereof, including any marks, 
pain or minor injury.7  However, BDSM practitioners are in danger of 
criminal prosecution because the law does not recognize consent as a 
defense to assault or battery, and those BDSM activities that result in pain 
or minor injury tend to meet the legal definitions of assault and battery, as 
described below.8 
 Note that I will use the terms “performer” and “recipient” to refer, 
respectively, to the person performing an action that may cause pain or 
minor injury, and the person on the receiving end of that action.   
B. CRIMINAL ASSAULT AND BATTERY  
I will be using the California Penal Code to exemplify the way that 
criminal assault and battery are defined within the legal system.  While 
many states may have different wording in their statutes, none recognize 
exceptions for BDSM practices, and none make a defense of consent 
available to a performer that is engaging in consensual activity with a 
recipient. 
The California Penal Code defines assault as “an unlawful attempt . . . 
to commit a violent injury on the person of another”9 and battery as “any 
willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.”10  
An initial reading raises questions about the utilized terminology.  In the 
case of assault, what is “a violent injury”?  Does the inclusion of the phrase 
“unlawful” imply the existence of a “lawful attempt” to commit a violent 
injury?  If so, what is the difference between a lawful attempt and an 
unlawful attempt?  In the case of battery, what is a “use of force or 
violence” and, similar to assault, what makes it lawful or unlawful? 
First, in addressing assault, courts have interpreted the phrase “commit 
a violent injury” to mean the commission of any act of physical force 
against the person of another, even if the act does not actually result in 
pain, marks, or any tangible form of bodily harm.11  Likewise, in 
 
 6. Gemberling, supra note 4, at 26. 
 7. WEISS, supra note 3, at 80–81; see also Elisabeth Sheff & Corie Hammers, The 
Privilege of Perversities: Race, Class and Education Among Polyamorists and Kinksters, 
Vol. 2 No. 3 PSYCHOL. & SEXUALITY 198, 202 (2011), https://elisabethsheff.files.word 
press.com/2013/11/the-privilege-of-perversities-20111.pdf. 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
 9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (2016). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., People v. James, 9 Cal. App. 2d 162, 163 (1935) (explaining that the term 
“violence” in relation to assault “include[s] any application of force even though it entails 
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addressing what constitutes “force or violence” as an element of battery, 
courts have noted the following: 
The word ‘violence’ has no real significance.  It has long been 
established, both in tort and criminal law, that ‘the least touching’ 
may constitute battery.  In other words, any minor force against the 
person is enough; it need not be violent or severe, it need not cause 
bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave any mark.12 
Under these legal definitions, a BDSM performer may easily be 
confused with a criminal perpetrator of assault and battery.  If a performer 
were to strike a recipient with a paddle, even gently so as not to leave a 
mark, that action would meet the definition of “commit a violent injury” or 
“use of force or violence” under California law.  
Secondly, there is certainly a legal difference between an “unlawful 
attempt” and a “lawful attempt.”  For example, a “lawful attempt” to 
commit a violent injury would occur where someone is acting in self-
defense.13  Accordingly, a use of force or violence in defense of another 
would likely be lawful as well.  I argue that many actions made with the 
consent of the other party should also be considered lawful, however, the 
courts have not yet recognized such a distinction in relation to BDSM.14 
 The California Penal Code also defines a second type of assault: that 
committed “with a deadly weapon or by force likely to produce great 
bodily injury.”15  More questions arise, such as what is a “deadly weapon,” 
and what is “force likely to produce great bodily injury”?  
Courts have been hesitant to create a concrete list of objects that may 
qualify as a “deadly weapon.”  California courts recognize that “[a]n 
instrumentality is a deadly weapon if it is capable of being used to inflict 
death or great bodily injury, and if its possessor intends to use it as a 
weapon should the circumstances require it,” but whether a particular 
object is a deadly weapon remains a question of fact that must be decided 
by a jury on a case-by-case basis.16  The objects that juries have found to be 
 
no pain or bodily harm and leaves no mark.”); People v. Flummerfelt, 153 Cal. App. 2d 104, 
106 (1957) (same). 
 12. People v. Mansfield, 200 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87–88 (1988) (internal citations omitted). 
 13. People v. Lynch, 101 Cal. 229, 230-31 (1894) (“One person cannot assault another in 
self-defense. An assault in itself is unlawful, and any act done in self-defense cannot be an 
assault.”). 
 14. Such a distinction has been recognized in relation to contact sports, however. See 
People v. Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d 501, 513 (1967). 
 15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (2016). 
 16. People v. Curcio, 255 Cal. App. 2d 183, 190 (1967); see also People v. Fisher, 234 
Cal. App. 2d 189, 193 (1965); but see People v. Aguilar, 16 Cal. 4th 1023, 1029 (1997) 
(noting that a “few objects, such as dirks and blackjacks, have been held to be deadly 
weapons as a matter of law; the ordinary use for which they are designed establishes their 
character as such”). 
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a “deadly weapon” range from obvious items, such as a knife17 or a car,18 to 
less obvious items, such as a pencil,19 a fingernail file,20 or even a pillow.21  
With such interpretations, a performer’s paddle could conceivably be seen 
as a deadly weapon.  In fact, juries have found that hands and whips may 
both be deadly weapons, and both are common tools that a performer may 
use on a recipient during a BDSM encounter.22 
Similarly, what constitutes “force likely to produce great bodily injury” 
is also a question left to a jury.23  When proscribing jury instructions, a 
judge will describe “great bodily injury” as “significant or substantial 
bodily injury or damage,” which does nothing to clarify the term.24  Like 
those tasked with defining a deadly weapon, juries asked to define “great 
bodily injury,” and determine what force is likely to cause it, have put 
forward a range of interpretations depending on the circumstances of each 
case.25 
With such obscure definitions, it is easy to see how consensual BDSM 
practices may be confused with criminal assault and battery.  When a 
bruise is evidence of “force or violence,” and hands may be seen as deadly 
weapons, we see the deficiencies of the law in creating a space for 
consensual BDSM activity.  It would be simple for a court to rule that 
consensual activity should be considered a “lawful attempt” or a “lawful 
use of force or violence,” or for the legislature to include a consent-defense 
within these statutes, and yet neither of those have occurred.26  Until one or 
both does occur, BDSM performers remain in the shadows of the law, 
constantly at risk of needless criminal prosecution. 
 
 17. Hockenberry v. United States, 422 F.2d 171, 173 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 18. People v. Claborn, 224 Cal. App. 2d 38, 42 (1964). 
 19. People v. Page, 123 Cal. App. 4th 1466, 1473-74 (2004). 
 20. People v. Russell, 59 Cal. App. 2d 660, 665 (1943). 
 21. People v. Helms, 242 Cal. App. 2d 476, 486-87 (1966). 
 22. See People v. Schmidt, 66 Cal. App. 2d 253, 256 (1944) (“One may be guilty of this 
crime although the attack is made with the hands.”); People v. Gray, 224 Cal. App. 2d 76, 
79 (1964) (same); see also People v. Kimbrel, 120 Cal. App. 3d 869 (1981) (Jury found the 
use of a whip chord to meet the requirements for an assault with a deadly weapon conviction 
under section 245 of the California Penal Code.). 
 23. See People v. Zankich, 189 Cal. App. 2d 54, 70 (1961); People v. White, 195 Cal. 
App. 2d 389, 392 (1961). 
 24. People v. Duke, 174 Cal. App. 3d 296, 277 (1985). 
 25. Compare People v. Armstrong, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1060 (1992) (grabbing both sides of 
victim’s mouth and putting hand in victim’s mouth constituted force likely to produce great 
bodily injury), with People v. Horton, 213 Cal. App. 2d 185 (1963) (kicking victim in the 
head is force likely to produce great bodily injury), and People v. Russel, 129 Cal. App. 4th 
776 (2005) (pushing victim into the path of a motor vehicle is force likely to produce great 
bodily injury). 
 26. The National Coalition for Sexual Freedom, however, has been attempting to change 
the law’s treatment of BDSM activities through a nationwide activism program called 
Consent Counts. Details available at:  https://ncsfreedom.org/key-programs/consent-
counts/consent-counts.html. 
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C. BDSM CASES 
 In the 1886 case People v. Gordon, the California Supreme Court 
acknowledged a consent defense to criminal assault charges.27  There, the 
court explained that an attempt to commit a violent injury on the person of 
another, per the California assault statute described above, “must be made 
without the consent of the person against whom it is made.  If it be made 
with his consent, it will not constitute an assault.  It is a maxim of the law 
that one who consents to an act is not wronged by it.”28  While Gordon has 
never been overruled, California courts have since strayed from this 
reasoning.  The alternative approach taken by subsequent courts begs the 
question: was it moral disapproval of BDSM practices that made them 
change their minds?  Readers should keep this question in mind while 
reviewing the courts’ analyses in the following cases. 
The earliest assault case referencing sadomasochism29 is the 1967 case 
People v. Samuels, which remains good law today.30  In that case, 
defendant Samuels was an ophthalmologist with sadomasochistic 
tendencies.31  He indulged these tendencies with consenting partners, 
whom he would bind and whip, filming and taking photographs along the 
way.32  Samuels sent one of the rolls of film to a company for processing, 
and the company’s employees, unaware of what they were seeing, showed 
the film to police.33  The police then arrested Samuels and charged him 
with aggravated assault.34  
 At trial, Samuels asserted that the recipient’s consent should act as a 
complete defense to the aggravated assault charges.35  Rejecting this 
argument, the court reasoned that consent may not be a defense to battery 
or assault, except in the case of contact sports.36  The court went on to 
explain that even if the recipient had consented to the whipping contained 
in the films, anyone who would consent to such things must be suffering 
from “some form of mental aberration.”37  Reasoning that such a mental 
aberration is akin to insanity, the court concluded that the consent of an 
insane person is “ineffective” and, therefore, insufficient as a defense.38  
This line of reasoning is clear evidence of bias against a BDSM performer.  
The judge could not possibly accept a consent-defense because he had such 
 
 27. 70 Cal. 467 (1886). 
 28. Id. at 468. 
 29. At least the earliest case I was able to find on LexisNexis or Westlaw. 
 30. See People v. Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d 501, 513 (1967). 
 31. Id. at 504. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 505. 
 34. Id. at 505–06. 
 35. Id. at 513. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 514–515. 
 38. Id. 
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moral disapproval of BDSM.  He believed all BDSM recipients must be 
insane. 
 While the judgment that people who participate in BDSM activities 
are insane has disappeared from more recent cases,39 courts have been 
consistently unwilling to accept consent as a defense to assault or battery.  
Instead, the courts have placed public policy concerns above any possible 
sexual privacy rights of the participants.  The two big public policy 
concerns asserted by states, and upheld by courts, in support of the 
criminalization of BDSM are public safety and morality. 
For example, in Commonwealth v. Appleby the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts refused to allow a consent defense to criminal charges of 
assault and battery even though the case involved alleged consensual 
BDSM activities.40  The court reasoned: 
The fact that violence may be related to sexual activity (or may 
even be sexual activity to the person inflicting pain on another, as 
[the defendant] testified) does not prevent the State from protecting 
its citizens against physical harm.41 
Similarly, the Iowa Court of Appeals in State v. Collier explained:  
Whatever rights the defendant may enjoy regarding private sexual 
activity, when such activity results in the whipping or beating of 
another resulting in bodily injury, such rights are outweighed by 
the State's interest in protecting its citizens' health, safety, and 
moral welfare . . . . A state unquestionably has the power to protect 
its vital interest in the preservation of public peace and tranquility, 
and may prohibit such conduct when it poses a threat thereto.42 
The pattern continued in People v. Jovanovic:  
There is no available defense of consent on a charge of assault . . . 
Indeed, while a meaningful distinction can be made between an 
ordinary violent beating and violence in which both parties 
voluntarily participate for their own sexual gratification, 
 
 39. In fact, recent studies show that BDSM practitioners may exhibit superior mental 
health. Compared with a control group, “BDSM practitioners were less neurotic, more 
extraverted, more open to new experiences, more conscientious, less rejection sensitive, had 
higher subjective well-being” and were generally more favorable. Andreas A.J. Wismeijer 
& Marcel A.L.M. van Assen, Psychological Characteristics of BDSM Practitioners, 10 J. OF 
SEXUAL MED., 1943, 1943-52 (2013), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ 
jsm.12192/abstract; see also Gemberling, supra note 4, at 25 (finding that BDSM 
participants exhibited “no overwhelming concerns within a range of mental and emotional 
factors,” and that “[c]ollectively, all results undermine the equation of BDSM to mental 
illness and/or violence.”).  
 40. 380 Mass. 296, 1060–61 (1980). 
 41. Id. 
 42. 372 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). 
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nevertheless, just as a person cannot consent to his or her own 
murder as a matter of public policy, a person cannot avoid criminal 
responsibility for an assault that causes injury or carries a risk of 
serious harm, even if the victim asked for or consented to the act.43  
The above cases have led to a dangerous standard that courts in other 
jurisdictions have been unwilling to challenge.  For example, in State v. 
Van, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed an assault case in which the 
defendant alleged that the conduct at issue was a consensual part of his 
BDSM relationship.44  In responding to the defendant’s request for a 
defense based on consent, the court noted that it had previously disallowed 
consent as a defense to violent assaults.45  The court then distinguished this 
case, however, reasoning that it had “not previously had occasion to 
determine the applicability of this principle to a BDSM relationship.”46  It 
then declined to analyze the issue because “other courts have [already] 
done so.”47  Citing all of the above cases (Samuels, Appleby, Javonavic and 
Collier), the court did not allow the defendant to develop a defense based 
on consent.48  Though not bound by any of those decisions, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court found a way to avoid any examination of the issue by 
adopting the reasoning of other jurisdictions.  
This conservative approach has continued into cases as recent as 2015.  
The court in People v. Davidson held that consent is not a recognized 
defense to assault “even when based on a claim of consensual 
sadomasochistic activity.”49  As the Davidson court explained, lack of 
consent is not an element of the offense of assault, so the presence of 
consent does not eliminate the crime.50 
Despite repeated judicial recognition that many people actively engage 
in consensual BDSM practices, courts and legislators alike have yet to 
create a space in the law for legal BDSM.  While BDSM participants are no 
longer viewed as “insane,” there is still a stigma attached to this form of 
sexual expression.  This stigma is exemplified by the above courts’ 
unwillingness to even question the state interests offered in support of 
BDSM criminalization, despite their dubious nature.  
One such state interest is public health and safety.  The Jovanovic 
court, for example, likens a consent-defense to assault to a consent-defense 
to one’s own murder, explaining that the same public policy concerns are at 
 
 43. 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 168 n.5 (App. Div. 1999) (internal citations omitted). 
 44. 688 N.W.2d 600, 613 (Neb. 2004). 
 45. Id. at 614. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. No. D064880, 2015 Cal. App. LEXIS 5720, at *23 (Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015). 
 50. Id. 
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play in either scenario.51  However, the large majority of harm resulting 
from BDSM practices is less than that caused by a tattoo, a piercing, or 
participation in contact sports, all of which are legal activities.  The fact 
that a consent-defense to murder is part of the same conversation is 
unwarranted, and shows that BDSM is either incredibly misunderstood, or 
that there is still a lot of prejudice against BDSM practitioners.  While both 
may be true, the second asserted state interest indicates that the latter is 
more controlling. 
In addition to public safety, the Collier court explained that states may 
criminalize consensual BDSM because they have a legitimate interest in 
protecting the moral welfare of their citizens.52  The unavoidable 
assumption at the heart of this reasoning is that BDSM is patently immoral, 
so legalizing it would threaten the morality of the populace.  The following 
discussion will show that this same reasoning has been used to criminalize 
and condemn other unconventional expressions of love and sexuality, and 
that courts are starting to question the validity of such arguments.53 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS WITH RESPECT 
TO SEXUAL ACTIVITY 
Until recently, sexual privacy rights have only been recognized within 
the reproductive sphere.  In 1942, the Supreme Court struck down an 
Oklahoma law that authorized the sterilization of “habitual criminals” 
because, among other things, it infringed on “one of the basic civil rights of 
man”— procreation.54  In 1965, the Court struck down a Connecticut law 
prohibiting the use of birth control, and in doing so recognized a right to 
marital privacy regarding the decision to have children.55  Over the 
following eight years, the Court extended that same privacy right to single 
people,56 and went on to expand that right to include the right to terminate a 
pregnancy.57  All of these cases touch upon the right to be free from 
governmental inference with one’s intimate relationships, but all are 
restricted to reproductive rights. 
More recently, we begin to see courts addressing sexual privacy rights 
in a broader context.  Lawrence v. Texas, the landmark case in which the 
Supreme Court held that anti-sodomy laws targeting same-sex partners are 
unconstitutional, represents a paradigm shift in the way that the nation’s 
highest Court has been willing to apply the rationale behind privacy rights 
 
 51. Jovanovie, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 168.  
 52. Collier, 372 N.W.2d at 305. 
 53. See discussion of Lawrence v. Texas infra Part II. 
 54. Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 55. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 56. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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to laws that target sexual conduct.58  The Lawrence holding contained three 
key points of analysis that are relevant when thinking about the law’s 
treatment of BDSM. 
One key point is that the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protection of Substantive Due Process, rather than Equal Protection, to 
strike down the Texas statute.59  The Court explained that to invalidate the 
law under an Equal Protection framework would suggest that a similar 
statute that applies to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples, as opposed 
to only same-sex couples, would be constitutional.60  The Court rejected 
this analysis because the fatal flaw of the statute was not whom it targeted, 
but the conduct that it targeted: intimate and personal conduct with which 
the State may not legally interfere.61  The Court reasoned that adults 
engaging in consensual sexual activity are entitled to “respect for their 
private lives,” and further declared that “[t]he State cannot demean their 
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a 
crime.  The right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the 
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government.”62  
These same words can be applied to consensual BDSM.  If adults 
engaging in consensual sexual activity are entitled to respect for their 
private lives, the government should not be allowed to criminalize BDSM.  
Under this analysis, the lack of a consent-defense looks like a violation of 
the Due Process rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  While assault and 
battery statutes were not purposefully designed to target BDSM conduct, 
unlike the statutes in Lawrence (which purposefully targeted homosexual 
conduct), both have the effect of turning sexually active, consenting adults 
into criminals. 
A second key point in Lawrence is the Court’s rejection of the state’s 
asserted interest in morality as a basis for upholding the law.63  When 
framing the issue as “whether the majority may use the power of the State 
to enforce [its] views on the whole society through operation of the 
criminal law,” the Court made clear that its “obligation is to define the 
liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own moral code.”64  With these words, 
the Supreme Court made it clear that moral disapproval of a certain 
practice is not sufficient reason by itself to prohibit that practice.65  As a 
 
 58. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 59. Id. at 575. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 574. 
 62. Id. at 578. 
 63. Id. at 571, 577–78. 
 64. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 
(1992)). 
 65. Id. at 577. 
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result, the Supreme Court invalidated part of the reasoning used by the 
court in Collier, which accepted the state’s interest in protecting moral 
welfare as a reason to disallow a consent-defense for BDSM activities.66 
A third key point of analysis is the Court’s recognition of the Model 
Penal Code’s treatment of consensual private activity.67  In 1955, when the 
American Law Institute released the Model Penal Code, it “made clear that 
it did not recommend or provide for ‘criminal penalties for consensual 
sexual relations conducted in private.’”68  These comments show a 
historical hesitance among legal scholars to criminalize private sexual 
activities between consenting adults, regardless of society’s moral 
judgments about those activities.  Additionally, the Model Penal Code 
recognizes a consent-defense to assault.69 
 The Lawrence decision represents an evolution in the way the 
Supreme Court has approached sexual privacy rights.  It sends a strong 
signal that courts should be more open to unconventional expressions of 
love and sexuality as a matter of constitutional law, and warns that the 
strength of morality as a legitimate governmental interest is waning.  
Lower courts’ inconsistency in fully applying Lawrence, however, shows 
that jurisprudence in this area is still in need of development.  This issue is 
explored further below. 
III. CRIMINALIZATION OF THE SALE OF SEX TOYS 
One area in which Lawrence has been applied inconsistently is legal 
challenges to criminal bans on sex toys and other sexual devices.  Alabama 
is among a handful of states that make the distribution of sex toys illegal.70  
Under Alabama’s anti-obscenity laws, the distribution of materials or 
devices “designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of 
human genital organs” is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to 
$10,000 and service of up to one year in jail.71  
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the constitutionality of this statute in 
Williams v. Morgan,72 wherein the court highlighted that the Supreme 
Court in Lawrence had not expressly recognized a fundamental right to 
sexual privacy.73  In the absence of a fundamental right, which would 
require heightened scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit applied a rational basis 
test and held that the state’s interest in morality was a sufficiently rational 
 
 66. Collier, 372 N.W.2d at 305. 
 67. Id. at 572. 
 68. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2, cmt 2 at 372 (AM. LAW INST. 1980)). 
 69. See infra Part V. 
 70. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2015); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 
(2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80(c) (2010). 
 71. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1). 
 72. 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 73. Id. at 1320. 
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basis to maintain the prohibition of the sale of sex toys.74  Petitioner argued 
that morality was no longer a rational basis under Lawrence, but the court 
rejected that argument, reasoning that Lawrence did not indicate 
disapproval of moral justifications in all cases, but only those cases that 
target private, noncommercial activity.75  Explaining that the Alabama 
statute only regulated public, commercial activity, the court did not view 
Lawrence as barring a state interest based on moral concerns.76  When the 
Alabama statute was challenged again, three years after Williams, the 
Alabama Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit and 
the statute survived once again.77 
Not all jurisdictions are in agreement about that application of the 
rational basis test post-Lawrence.  Applying the same test, the Fifth Circuit 
struck down a similar statute that banned the sale of sex toys in Texas.78  In 
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, the Fifth Circuit held that, under 
Lawrence, public morality was no longer a sufficient rational basis to 
justify a law that interfered with the Substantive Due Process rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution.79  When faced with the distinction between 
private, noncommercial activity and public, commercial activity, the Fifth 
Circuit, unlike the Eleventh Circuit, explained that Supreme Court 
precedent dictates that “bans on commercial transactions involving a 
product can unconstitutionally burden individual substantive due process 
rights.”80  Therefore, when regulations on public, commercial activity 
substantially interfere with an individual’s right to conduct private, non-
commercial activity, then the regulations are inherently unconstitutional.81  
The Supreme Court of Louisiana expressed the same reasoning when it 
struck down Louisiana’s law banning the sale of sexual devices.82 
This inconsistency evidences that Lawrence has led to confusion 
among the lower courts as to when morality may or may not be used in a 
rational basis review.  However, both approaches suggest that the 
criminalization of consensual BDSM activities is unconstitutional.  Under 
the Fifth Circuit’s more liberal interpretation in Reliable Consultants, 
morality can never be used as a legitimate state interest when it burdens 
individual sexual privacy rights.  Even under the Eleventh Circuit’s more 
conservative ruling, morality cannot be used as a legitimate state interest 
 
 74. Morgan, 478 F.3d at 1323. 
 75. Id. at 1321–22. 
 76. Id. at 1323. 
 77. See 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 45 So. 3d 319 (Ala. 2010). 
 78. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 79. Id. at 745. 
 80. Id. at 743. 
 81. Id. 
 82. State v. Brenan, 99-2291 (La. 5/16/00); 772 So. 2d 64. 
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when it burdens private, noncommercial activity, a category that easily 
encapsulates consensual BDSM activities. 
IV. POLYAMORY 
Commercial regulation of sex toys is not the only area in which courts 
are rejecting moral judgments of sexuality.  This attitude may also be seen 
with courts that address polyamorous practices, which can be defined in 
terms that go beyond sexual conduct and into the realm of family and 
relationship structure. 
Polyamory is not a recent phenomenon, but it is only recently that the 
polyamorous community has begun to openly demand respect and 
recognition from society as well as the judicial system.83  Researchers 
estimate that there are anywhere between 1.2 million and 9.8 million 
Americans that identify as polyamorous, though it has been difficult to 
narrow down that range because of differing views about the definition of 
polyamory.84  For the purposes of this article, the definition of polyamory is 
the practice of emotionally committing to multiple partners, as opposed to 
popular conceptions of couples that “swing” or have “open relationships,” 
where there is typically no emotional element.85 
With the increased publicity of polyamory, polyamorous parents are at 
particular risk of prejudice during custody proceedings, where 
misunderstandings about the preference for multiple partners could lead a 
judge to declare that polyamorous tendencies make a parent unfit.  While 
some courts have adopted this attitude,86 many courts have reasoned that 
this romantic and sexual lifestyle should not, by itself, have a negative 
effect on parental rights. 
 For example, in In the Interest of R.E., a juvenile court terminated 
the parental rights of a mother because, among other things, she had “failed 
to complete counseling to address her poly-amorous lifestyle which has 
negatively affected the children.”87  In reversing the juvenile court’s 
decision, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that there was no evidence to 
 
 83. Jessica Bennett, Polyamory: The Next Sexual Revolution?, NEWSWEEK (July 28, 
2009), http://www.newsweek.com/polyamory-next-sexual-revolution-82053. 
 84. Elisabeth A. Sheff, How Many Polyamorists Are There in the US?, PSYCHOLOGY 
TODAY, May 9, 2014, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-polyamorists-next-door/ 
201405/how-many-polyamorists-are-there-in-the-us. 
 85. Elaine Cook, Commitment in Polyamorous Relationships, THE KINSEY INSTITUTE 10 
(2005), http://www.kinseyinstitute.org/library/e-text/Cook_Elaine.pdf (noting that “the 
difference between polyamory and swinging is that in polyamory there is a focus on love 
and the emotional relationship with other lovers, whereas swinging is often recreational sex, 
with an explicit intention to avoid an emotional connection”). 
 86. See, e.g., Cross v. Cross, 5 Pa. D. & C.5th 12, 21 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2008) (explaining that 
polyamory is “grossly inappropriate conduct” and would be a source of embarrassment for 
the children). 
 87. 775 S.E.2d 542, 546 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). 
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support that the children were harmed by the polyamorous lifestyle.88  
Evidence of harm to the children must meet the “clear and convincing” 
evidence standard to sever the parent-child relationship, and the court ruled 
that the standard had not been met by mere existence of a parent’s 
polyamory.89 
While the complete termination of parental rights requires a high 
standard of evidence, courts have been unwilling to use polyamory against 
parents even when the stakes are lower.  In Johnson v. Bower, the Court of 
Appeals of Indiana refused to give weight to a father’s claim that the 
children were suffering after the mother moved them into the polyamorous 
household of their grandparents.90  The court noted that there was no 
evidence to support the existence of any emotional or psychological harm 
caused by exposure to polyamory.91  Absent such evidence, the court 
explained, “this Court is not about to impose such a moral code where none 
exists in the Indiana statutes regarding custody.”92  While the court seems 
to leave a door open to the Indiana legislature to codify discrimination 
against polyamorous parents, the legislature has not acted on the comment.  
Similarly, in V.B. v. J.E.B., the Pennsylvania Superior Court was 
unwilling to take custody from a polyamorous father when there was no 
evidence that the polyamory was negatively affecting the children.93  In 
fact, in reversing the decision of the trial court, the Superior Court noted 
that the lower court’s analysis was tainted by prejudice against a 
polyamorous lifestyle.94  As noted, “the record reveals the trial court’s 
general disfavor of polyamory weighed in its custody determination . . . 
[and] it fails to support its concomitant conclusion that the unorthodox 
lifestyle was detrimental to the children in this case.”95  The Superior Court 
was unwilling to affirm a decision that was clearly influenced by moral 
disapproval. 
Underlying these opinions is the notion that moral disapproval of a 
given practice is not sufficient evidence that the practice actually causes 
harm.  Even in the case of children, who are most vulnerable and 
impressionable, courts have been unwilling to use morality as justification 
to punish those that engage in untraditional, but consensual, expressions of 
love and sexuality.  
 
 88. In re Interest of R.E., 775 S.E.2d at 57. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Johnson v. Bower, No. 54A04-1102-DR-108, 2011 Ind. App. LEXIS 1535, at *7 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 
 91. Id. at *8 
 92. Id. 
 93. 55 A.3d 1193, 1201 (P.A. Super. Ct. 2012). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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This same reasoning can be applied to BDSM practices.  As discussed 
above, the two reasons offered in support of the criminalization of BDSM 
are public safety and morality.  Given that BDSM is unlikely to cause 
serious injury, and in fact did not cause serious injury in the cases 
discussed above,96 the main concern in preventing a consent-defense to 
assault is morality.  The concern about safety seems to be a byproduct of 
moral disapproval, which is causing misunderstandings about BDSM’s 
relationship with public safety.  However, these decisions addressing 
polyamory show that courts are becoming more willing to place sexual 
privacy rights over their own perceptions of morality.  Likewise, the 
Lawrence decision makes moral justifications suspect.  It is time to find a 
place in the law for consensual BDSM practices. 
V.  A DIFFERENT LEGAL APPROACH TO BDSM 
 With the growing recognition of sexual privacy rights after Lawrence, 
there is little question that consensual BDSM falls within the sphere of 
intimate activity that should be protected from governmental influence.  In 
those cases where consent is not at issue, it is time for the law to recognize 
that it is an individual’s constitutional right to express his or her sexuality 
in a way that is free from state interference.  In those cases where consent 
is at issue, courts should approach the case like a rape case, instead of 
refusing to even consider a consent defense.  A number of solutions have 
been offered in response to this problem. 
 One proposition is that states adopt Model Penal Code (“MPC”) § 
2.11(2)(a),97 which allows defendants in assault cases to raise the defense 
of consent so long as the injury is “not serious.”98  The MPC goes on to 
define “serious” injury as “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of 
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss 
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.”99  The large 
majority of injury caused by BDSM activities, such as bruises, scratches, or 
other marks, would be categorized as “not serious,” therefor allowing the 
use of consent as a defense.  Combined with the American Law Institute’s 
recommendations that consensual sexual activity not be criminalized,100 the 
MPC looks very friendly to BDSM practitioners. 
 
 96. See supra Part I.C. 
 97. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2013), which reads:  
Consent to Bodily Harm. When conduct is charged to constitute an 
offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such 
conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if: (a) the bodily 
harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not 
serious . . . .. 
 98. Daniel Haley, Bound by Law: A Roadmap for the Practical Legalization of BDSM, 21 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 631, 650–51 (2015). 
 99. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2013). 
 100. See supra note 66.  
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Such a solution would have been more than sufficient to prevent the 
conviction in the Samuels case,101 and perhaps in other cases, as well.  The 
MPC approach would give BDSM practitioners the freedom to engage each 
other without fear of criminal prosecution, which is a big change from the 
California laws that make any act of physical force, even if the act does not 
actually result in pain, marks, or bodily harm, a crime.102  
Additionally, the MPC approach addresses the asserted state interest in 
protecting public health and safety.  When consent cannot be used as a 
defense to “serious” harm or bodily injury, then the public policy concerns 
regarding health and safety, like those raised by the Javonavic court, 
become even more unconvincing.103  Again, I raise the comparison to a 
tattoo, a piercing, or contact sports.  If minor injury is legally justifiable in 
those cases, it should be legally justifiable in the arena of sexual 
expression, even if that form of sexual expression is unconventional. 
 A more comprehensive approach to the legalization of BDSM may 
be found under a theory suggested by law professor Vera Bergelson. 
Bergelson proposes a reexamination of the legal concepts of “harm” and 
“consent.”104  Her analysis of “harm” leads to two significant definitions of 
the word: 1) a wrongful violation of rights, and 2) a violation of one’s 
dignity.105  Consent, acting as a voluntary waiver of one’s rights, eliminates 
any harm under the first definition.  That elimination of harm eliminates 
any need for legal action, because without harm there is no crime.106  
To determine if harm has been committed under the second definition, 
the violation of one’s dignity, Bergelson recommends a balancing approach 
that considers both the intent of the performer and the desire of the 
recipient.107  If, for example, the recipient desires the activity in question, 
and the performer performs the act with good faith attention to the 
recipient’s interests and dignity, then no harm has been committed.108  Both 
performer and recipient are benefitting from the exchange, and neither 
suffers at the advantage of the other.  The dignity of both participants is left 
intact. 
Bergelson’s proposition also requires that the benefit of the activity 
outweigh the resulting consequence.109  In balancing the benefit and the 
consequence, full consideration is given both to the emotional and physical 
cost to the recipient, as well as the theoretical cost to society.  This 
 
 101. See Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d at 513. 
 102. See supra Part I.B. 
 103. See Jovanovie, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 168. 
 104. Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 165 (2007). 
 105. Id. at 170. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 171. 
 109. Id. 
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requirement would prevent any serious injury from escaping the two given 
definitions of harm. 
In a BDSM context, Bergelson’s approach, like the MPC approach, 
would prevent the use of consent as a defense to murder or severe physical 
impairment, thus eliminating those concerns regarding public health and 
safety.  Likewise, Bergelson’s approach would allow consent to be used as 
a defense for consensual BDSM activities that may result in minor injury, 
such as bruises, welts, or scratches. 
 A third option is to create a legal exception for consensual BDSM 
activities in the laws governing criminal assault and battery.110  Unlike the 
previously mentioned MPC approach, which allows for consent to be used 
as a defense to any form of assault, such as a fight between rivals, this 
approach would single out those activities that are specific to BDSM 
conduct, only allowing a consent defense in those cases.  Such an exception 
could be codified within the statute by direct reference to consensual sexual 
activities that involve an element of pain or injury.  The key here would be 
for the legislature to highlight that informed consent is required for use of 
the defense, and to specify that consent will only be a viable defense to 
actions that do not result in serious bodily harm or injury.  To define 
“serious bodily harm or injury,” I would recommend utilizing the definition 
outlined in the MPC.111  Note that, under this approach, the defense is only 
unavailable when serious harm actually occurs, without reference to the 
potential risk involved in an activity. 
 A fourth option is to include consensual BDSM activity within the 
sphere of “lawful” uses or attempts to use force against another person.  
For those states that define assault as “an unlawful attempt to commit a 
violent injury on the person of another,” and battery as “an unlawful use of 
force,” like California, BDSM would no longer be categorized as 
“unlawful.”  The statutory definitions would remain the same, but they 
would no longer apply to consensual sexual activities, which would be 
lawful.  
While the third option would require legislative action to change the 
penal codes, this fourth option can be accomplished through judicial action.  
It is the judiciary that recognized self-defense as a “lawful” use of force,112 
and so the judiciary could grant the same recognition to consensual BDSM 
activities.  A court applying the reasoning of Lawrence would not have a 
difficult time recognizing that sexual privacy should now be a priority 
under the Due Process Clause.  Just as Lawrence used Due Process to 
overrule a previous case that allowed the criminalization of sodomy, so 
could a court use Due Process to define BDSM as a “lawful” use of force. 
 
 110. Haley, supra note 98, at 652–53. 
 111. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2013). 
 112. See Lynch, 101 Cal. at 230–31. 
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At the heart of all of these propositions is the ability of the accused to 
prove the consent of the other party.  As many sexual assault cases show, 
however, consent is often difficult to prove.  The lines between consensual 
BDSM activity and sexual assault become even blurrier in situations where 
consent is revoked mid-encounter, like through the use of a safeword.113  
However, when consent can be proven, there is no legitimate value in 
prosecuting BDSM practitioners, as there is no real “victim.”  Similarly, 
there is no reason to deny a performer the opportunity to prove the consent 
of a recipient if there is ample evidence to support that the activities were 
consensual.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The law has been used many times in the past, either directly or 
indirectly, to criminalize activities based on the moral code of the majority.  
However, when those activities are consensual and do not result in serious 
injury, history has shown that personal liberty prevails over prejudice.  
When it comes to legal censure of unconventional expressions of love and 
sexuality, the protections guaranteed by the Constitution have been used to 
defeat the criminalization of numerous activities between consenting 
adults, including the use of birth control and the practice of sodomy, as 
discussed above,114 and even marriages that were, at one time or another, 
considered untraditional and immoral.115  It is time for courts to extend the 
same constitutional protections to BDSM practitioners. 
 One might argue that the rarity of modern BDSM cases implies that 
the need for legal recognition of consensual BDSM is minor.  However, 
even one conviction resulting from the inability to raise a consent defense 
is one conviction too many.  Additionally, the official legalization of 
BDSM will help reduce the stigma that is attached to these practices.  
A recent study by the National Coalition for Sexual Freedom shows 
that BDSM practitioners are at risk of discrimination because of their 
sexual preferences.116  Out of 3,058 people surveyed, 1,175 (37.5%) 
reported some form of persecution based on their participation in BDSM 
activities.117 Considering that most people keep their involvement in 
BDSM private, that number is astonishingly large.  Twenty percent 
reported the loss of a job or contract, while 12.2 percent reported losing a 
 
 113. Amanda O. Davis, COMMENT: Clarifying the Issue of Consent: The Evolution of 
Post-Penetration Rape Law, 34 STETSON L. REV. 729, 732-33 (2005). 
 114. See supra Part II. 
 115. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967). 
 116. Susan Wright, Second National Survey of Violence & Discrimination Against Sexual 
Minorities, NAT’L COAL. FOR SEXUAL PRIVACY 1 (2008), https://ncsfreedom.org/images 
/stories/pdfs/BDSM_Survey/2008_bdsm_survey_analysis_final.pdf. 
 117. Id. at 7. 
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promotion or being demoted.118  Over 6% lost custody of a child because of 
their association with BDSM, and over 4% were refused housing.119  
Additionally, 11.3% reported being discriminated against by professional 
service providers, including doctors, lawyers, police, and mental health 
providers.120  The study also shows BDSM practitioners are at risk of 
harassment, violence, and blackmail.121  If courts were to begin legally 
acknowledging BDSM, the stigma that has led to such discrimination 
would begin to disappear.  As public acceptance of an unconventional 
expression of love or sexuality increases, discrimination based on that 
expression is more likely to decrease. 
 While discrimination prevention is a noble reason to decriminalize 
BDSM, the best legal reason is that the Constitution demands it.  Under the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence, the Due Process Clause 
requires that states no longer use morality to justify laws that interfere with 
the private, sexual conduct of consenting adults.  United States courts are 
already applying the Lawrence logic to strike down laws that ban the sale 
of sex toys, and it is time for courts to apply that same logic to BDSM.  The 
state’s interest in morality is no longer sufficient to prevent a consent-
defense to assault or battery when consensual BDSM is alleged.  
Similarly, the state’s interest in public health and safety is suspect, as 
the risk of serious harm or injury is low in most BDSM contexts.  Even if 
certain BDSM activities create a higher risk of serious harm or injury, 
alternative legal approaches can address the state’s concern for public 
















 118. Wright, NAT’L COAL. FOR SEXUAL PRIVACY 1 at 9. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 11. 
 121. Id. at 14. 
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While BDSM practitioners may not be the designated targets of assault 
and battery laws, they have become purposeful casualties because of 
courts’ unwillingness to consider a consent-defense to a claim of 
consensual BDSM.  This unwillingness, however, is no longer defensible. 
With growing exposure to untraditional expressions of love and sexuality, 
and decreasing deference to states’ moral justifications, the time is right for 
courts to recognize that consensual BDSM practitioners are not criminals, 
and that criminalization of BDSM activities is unconstitutional. 
*** 
